Income divergence between mexican states in the 1990s: the role of skill premium by Aguayo Téllez, Ernesto
Growth and Change
Vol. 37 No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 255–277
Income Divergence between Mexican States in
the 1990s: The Role of Skill Premium
ERNESTO AGUAYO-TELLEZ
ABSTRACT During the period 1940–1985 the variance of average incomes across Mexican
states fell by 60 percent. Beginning in 1985, however, and coinciding with the adoption of trade
liberalization policies and other market-oriented reforms, state incomes began to diverge. Using
microdata from the 1990 and 2000 Mexican Population Censuses, this study decomposes the
recent divergence into components due to economy-wide changes in skill prices and components
due to state-specific changes in the composition of workers. The study finds that the rise in the
education premium hindered the progress of poor states and raised the variance of average state
wages and labor earnings. However, educational attainment mostly compensated for this income-
widening effect. State-level regressions reveal that the initial level of education, size of the 
agricultural sector, and distance from the U.S. border were important factors, while public infra-
structure was not. While the border states clearly benefited from increased trade and opening of
the economy, I find no evidence that skill demand or the immigration of highly educated workers
particularly favored these states. 
Introduction
S olow’s (1956) model predicts that if economies are similar with respect to prefer-ences and technology, poorer ones will grow faster than richer ones. In other words,
there is “economic convergence.” Over a period of more than four decades, Mexican states
appeared to obey these predictions of long-run convergence. However, coinciding with the
adoption of trade liberalization and other domestic reforms, economic convergence across
Mexican states broke down starting in the mid-1980s.1
This article uses individual data from the 1 percent sample of the 1990 and 2000
Mexican Population Censuses to examine the recent divergence in average incomes across
Mexican states. Extensive work has been done previously attempting to explain divergence
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in gross state product (GSP) between Mexican states. The purpose of this article is to study
the role of wages in the recent state divergence in Mexico. The benefits of using microlevel
data are twofold. First, by examining labor earnings and self-employment income, rather
than state-level output, I come closer to measuring changes in the welfare of a large major-
ity of the population. Second, the microdata allows an assessment of the importance of
changes in the composition of workers across states as well as a gauging of the impact of
an economy-wide increase in skill premiums.2 Using this type of income, I am able to
make inferences not obtained by previous research, which relied on aggregated produc-
tion data. However, labor earnings in Mexico represent only one-third of the total GSP.
To the extent that some states began with significantly lower levels of human capital,
one would expect the overall rise in the skill premium to adversely impact those states.
The study finds that the rise in skill prices did contribute to the divergence of state incomes.
However, state convergence in human capital acquisition has largely counterbalanced the
rise in skill prices. While initial educational levels and the rising skill premium were impor-
tant factors, they are not sufficient to explain the economic divergence across Mexican
states in the 1990s. Other demand-related factors appear to have favored the richer states.
The reduction of tariffs that protected the agricultural sector led to rapid declines in agri-
cultural employment while trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) spurred by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) favored states located close to the U.S. border.
Using state labor earnings, I find that the initial level of education, the share of agricul-
ture employment, and distance to the border are important in explaining the divergence,
while public infrastructure is not. Results using state product are qualitatively similar to
the results using state labor earnings but quantitatively not significant. The study also
examines whether the recent divergence is due largely to the rapid growth of the border
states. While these states may have benefited from liberalization by attracting more foreign
capital, I do not find that skill demand increased more rapidly in this region relative to
other regions. Examining migration patterns, there is also little evidence that the border
region attracted more human capital relative to other regions.3
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the second section reviews the related
literature; the third section examines the breakdown in convergence patterns and compares
state-level output data with income data from the censuses; the fourth section documents
the economy-wide increase in skill premiums and presents the contributions of (skill) price
and quantity composition effects; the fifth section reports the results of state-level regres-
sions; and the final section summarizes the conclusions. 
Related Literature
Most studies that examine the recent divergence in state incomes either directly or indi-
rectly emphasize trade liberalization and reforms as a cause. All previous literature used
aggregated GSP data and employed the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) methodol-
ogy to analyze the convergence–divergence pattern of Mexican states. Using GSP data for
1940–1995, Esquivel (1999) shows a relatively fast convergence process from 1940 to
1960 and a slower or even nonexistent convergence process from 1960 to 1995. Esquivel
attributes the lack of convergence during the last decades to the low levels of migration.
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In an earlier article, Mallick and Carayannis (1994) find evidence of stronger conver-
gence in GSP per capita in Mexico from 1970 to 1985 relative to existing estimates of
U.S. convergence. Juan-Ramon and Rivera-Batiz (1996) show that the divergence in GSP
per capita began before the implementation of the NAFTA. Messmacher (2000) concludes
that convergence in GSP per capita ended as the result of economic reforms and their 
structural effects on the manufacturing sector. Sanchez-Reaza and Rodriguez-Pose (2002)
attribute convergence in GSP per capita during the import substitution period (1940–1985)
to the discovery of oil reserves in the southern states of Campeche and Tabasco and 
divergence under the NAFTA (1993–2000) to international market proximity to the 
U.S., maquiladora investment, and the restructuring of Mexico City. 
Chiquiar (2002) argues that economic reforms altered the optimal location choice of
manufacturing firms toward the border and that the winners from the structural change of
the 1990s were those states initially endowed with, or able to attract, higher levels of human
and industrial capital. He finds divergence in GSP per capita even after controlling for 
differences in stead state levels of output. Esquivel and Messmacher (2002) propose 
that the divergent process of GSP per capita in the 1990s was driven mostly by differences
in labor productivity associated with education and infrastructure. Aroca, Bosch, and
Maloney (2003) report that, beyond the group of states bordering the U.S., there is a 
group of states in which income levels are almost randomly distributed. Therefore, proxi-
mity to the U.S. is not an important determinant of high income. Finally, Esquivel et al.
(2002) conclude that quality of governance and social instability are factors of equal 
importance. 
Convergence Breakdown
As shown in previous studies, Mexican states converged during the import substitution
period. Figure 1 displays the negative relationship between log GSP per capita in 1940 and
the annualized growth rate of GSP per capita from 1940 to 1985.4 The negative slope shows
that there was economic convergence during this period, with the poorer states growing
faster than the richer states. 
Since 1985, Mexico has witnessed economic divergence between states. Figure 2 dis-
plays the positive relationship between log GSP per capita in 1985 and the annualized
growth rate from 1985 to 2000. A large portion of the gain toward equality that was
achieved during the previous forty-five years was lost in a decade. 
To formalize the breakdown in convergence, I employ two broadly used indicators 
of between-state dispersion: s-convergence and b-convergence as discussed in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1991). s-Convergence is achieved when the variance of the natural 
logarithm of state product per capita (or income per capita) decreases through time. 
b-Convergence is defined by the following regression: 
(1)
where ln(Ys,t) − ln(Ys,t−1) is the change in state product (or income) per capita for state s,
Ys,t−1 is the initial level, and es is the error term.5 The sign of the coefficient of the regres-
sion associated with the initial level of state product (or income) per capita (b) indicates
ln ln ln, , ,Y Y Ys t s t s t s( ) − ( ) = + ( ) +− −1 1a b e
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FIGURE 1. CONVERGENCE ON GSP PER CAPITA, 1940–1985.
GSP, gross state product.
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FIGURE 2. DIVERGENCE ON GSP PER CAPITA, 1985–2000.
GSP, gross state product.
whether the richer states grew faster (positive) or slower (negative) than the poorer 
ones.
Table 1 lists the s-convergence and b-convergence estimators for GSP per capita for
the convergence period, 1940–1985; the divergence period, 1985–2000; as well as for the
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whole sample period, 1940–2000. The variance of log GSP per capita decreased from 0.37
in 1940 to 0.145 in 1985, which indicates s-convergence. Similarly, the estimates of b
during the import substitution period are all negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
In contrast, during the free-trade period, the variance of log GSP per capita increased from
0.145 in 1985 to 0.261 in 2000. The b estimator for this period is positive (0.331) and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates s- and b-divergence.
Gross state product per capita overestimates production in the “oil” states.6 In addition,
many private enterprises report profits where their office headquarters are located, in this
case Mexico City, not where the plants are located. This practice overestimates production
in the country’s capital. State labor earnings (SLE) per capita and state wages (WAGES)
are better estimators of population welfare because wages and self-employment income
represent much of the income of the majority of the population in each state. 
Income per capita would be a better measure of state wealth because it considers not
only labor income but also other sources of income. However, the “Mexican System of
National Accounts” does not provide this information at the state level and the Population
Census of 1990 did not collect information on any other sources of income except labor
income. Labor earnings in Mexico represent only one-third of total income. As a result,
the use of population census data will only explain a limited part of the divergence on
product between Mexican states.7
State labor earnings per capita and state wages can be estimated from the 1 percent
sample of the Population Censuses of 1990 and 2000. Mexican Population Census data
sets have a similar structure to the Current Population Surveys in the U.S. and contain
demographic characteristics such as age, education, and location, as well as labor market
outcomes such as activity, labor earnings, hours worked, occupation, and industry.8
Table 1 displays the s-convergence and the b-convergence estimators using SLE per
capita from 1990 to 2000. State labor earnings per capita as well as GSP per capita present
positive s (0.029 and 0.116) and b (0.050 and 0.331) estimates during the free-trade
period.9 This result is reassuring as both measures are based on two independent data
sources: the Mexican System of National Accounts and the Mexican Population 
Censuses.10 However, the results based on SLE per capita are less precise. 
In order to understand the sources of SLE per capita divergence, I decompose the
changes in SLE per capita ∆(SLEs/Pops) on changes in SLE per worker ∆(SLEs/Wkss),11
changes on state labor force participation ∆(Wkss/Asltss), and changes on state working
age population ∆(Adltss/Pops). Table 1 also shows the s-convergence and b-convergence
estimates of the three components of SLE per capita. The variance of log SLE per worker
increased 0.027, accounting for most of the rise in variance of SLE per capita (0.029).
Labor force participation (LFP) and working age population (WAP) account for trivial 
portions of the rise in variance of SLE per capita. 
Finally, Table 1 presents the s-convergence and the b-convergence estimators for an
alternative measure: Average State Wages, which are defined as labor earnings divided by
hours worked. As GSP per capita, SLE per capita, and SLE per worker, State Wages
diverged across states during the trade-liberalization period. The following analysis focuses
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on weekly SLE per worker and hourly state wages, which accounted for most of the 
divergence. 
Rising Skill Prices and Education—Decomposition Analysis 
Skill prices. After trade liberalization and domestic reforms, the wages of skilled
workers increased relative to wages of unskilled workers in Mexico. During the import
substitution period, Mexico followed policies that protected low-skilled labor. As the 
literature commonly suggests, economic liberalization and domestic reforms in Mexico
lead to an increase in skill demand in the economy.12
How would an increase in skill prices impact regional convergence patterns? To 
the extent that poorer regions began the decade significantly lagging in education and 
skill levels, one would expect the economy-wide increase in skill prices to contribute to
divergence. 
The following Mincerian wage equation was used to examine changes in skill prices: 
(2)
where EDUi,t is years of schooling, EXPi,t and EXP
2
i,t are years of potential experience and
its square, and GENi,t is a dummy variable for gender. 
I estimated the above equation separately for 1990 and 2000, using both log hourly
wages and log weekly earnings as the dependent variables. Table 2 reports the results. In
1990, every additional year of education increased wages by 8.5 percent. In 2000, the 
education return had increased to 10.6 percent. Estimates of the experience premium 
also increased during the decade while the male premium fell slightly. 
State-specific changes in skill quantities. From 1990 to 2000, average education
increased from 6.7 to 7.9 years and its standard deviation decreased from 4.5 to 4.4 years,
implying compression in the distribution of education across individuals. Richer states
have much higher education levels than poorer states. In 1990, the average education level
of a worker in the richest state, Baja California Norte, was 8.4 years and the average edu-
cation level of a worker in the poorest state, Chiapas, was 5.3 years. However, states with
the lower wages had the largest increases in educational attainment from 1990 to 2000,
implying convergence in workers’ education across Mexican states.13 Table 3 shows the 
s- and b-convergence estimates for mean education levels across states. Its variance
decreased 36 percent from 1.24 in 1990 to 0.786 in 2000. Similarly, the education b-
convergence estimate is negative and significant (−1.204).14
Experience levels are also converging as confirmed statistically in Table 3. Experience
levels are growing more rapidly in the richer states, which have had historically lower
levels of experience. The distribution of male work force across states is similar to the 
distribution of experience. Poorer states have higher rates of male labor force partici-
pation, but these differences decreased during the last decade. Table 3 indicates s- and b-
convergence based on workers’ gender composition.15
Wage decomposition analysis. Next, I build on the work of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
(1993) and Blau and Kahn (1997) on relative wage gaps to decompose changes in income
ln , , , , , ,Y EDU EXP EXP GENi t t t
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i t t
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i t i t( ) = + + + + +g g g g g n0 22
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differentials into economy-wide factors and “state-specific” factors. I decompose the
change in variance of incomes across states into a component due to the rise in skill prices
(the price effect) and a component due to state-specific changes in education and other
characteristics (the quantity effect). The following earnings equation is specified: 
(3)
where Yis,t is the hourly wage (or weekly labor earnings) of individual i in state s at time
t, Xis,t is a vector of individual characteristics usually associated with skill, gt is a vector of
prices, and vis,t is the error term. In fact, I use the Mincerian specification laid out in equa-
tion (2). The difference in state average wages between year 1 and year 0 can be written
as:
(4)
Rearranging terms, one has the following:
(5)
Changes in state wages, ln(Ys,1) − ln(Ys,0), can be decomposed into three parts: (1)
changes in skill prices, (g1 − g0)Xs,0; (2) changes in the quantities of skills, g1(Xs,1 − Xs,0);
and (3) changes in the residuals, (vs,1 − vs,0).
16
To make this decomposition operational, construct counterfactual state-level wages.
Wages are first predicted in 2000, keeping the distribution of skill endowments (Xs) and
state residuals (vs) fixed at 1990 levels, but allowing skill prices (g) to vary, as in the fol-
lowing:
(6)
Equivalently, substituting ln(Ys,90) with g90Xs,90 + vs,90, 
(6a)
Equations (6) and (6a) predict wages in 2000, allowing only skill premiums to vary. If one
allows both observable prices (g) and state skill endowments (Xs) to change to 2000 levels
but keeps the distribution of state residuals (vs) fixed at 1990 levels, wages in 2000 would
be defined by:
(7)
(7a)
Finally, if one allows observable prices (g) and state skill endowments (Xs) and the distri-
bution of the residuals to change to 2000 levels, one obtains:
(8)ln ln, , , , ,Y Y X X Xs
PQR
s s s s00 90 00 00 90 00 90 90 00 90( ) = ( ) + −( ) + −( ) + −( )g g g n n
or ln , , ,Y Xs
PQ
s s00 00 00 90( ) = +g n
ln ln, , , , ,Y Y X X Xs
PQ
s s s s00 90 00 00 90 00 90 90( ) = ( ) + −( ) + −( )g g g
ln ., , ,Y Xs
P
s s00 00 90 90( ) = +g n
ln ln ., , ,Y Y Xs
P
s s00 90 00 90 90( ) = ( ) + −( )g g
ln ln, , , , , , ,Y Y X X Xs s s s s s s1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0( ) − ( ) = −( ) + −( ) + −( )g g g n n
ln ln ., , , , , ,Y Y X Xs s s s s s1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0( ) − ( ) = − + −( )g g n n
ln , , ,Y Xis t t is t is t( ) = +g n
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(8a)
which replicates the actual wage distribution in 2000.
Having the estimated values of the skill premium in 1990 and 2000 ( and ), the
estimated state average residuals ( and ), and the observed 1990 and 2000 state skill
endowments (Xs,90 and Xs,00) I can estimate the values of ln( ), ln( ), and ln( ) 
for every state of Mexico. The technique is to attribute the change in state inequality in
ln( ) to changes in skill prices, then attribute any additional change in state inequality in
ln( ) to changes in state skill endowments, and finally to attribute any additional change
in state inequality for ln( ) beyond those found for ln( ) to changes in the distribu-
tion of the residuals.17
Table 4 lists the decomposition results for wages and SLE per worker. The variance 
of state wages increased 0.022 log points from 1990 to 2000. The variance of ln( ),
allowing only skill prices to change, increased by 0.009, accounting for 41 percent of the
increase in the variance of state wages. The variance of ln( ), allowing both skill prices
and skill state quantities to change, increased by 0.002. Therefore, attributing any addi-
tional change in state inequality in ln( ) over ln( ) to changes in state skill endow-
ments, inequality in the distribution of skill quantities across states decreased by 0.007,
accounting for a 32 percent reduction in the variance of wages. As the two effects move
in opposite directions, prices and quantities together account for 9 percent of the rise in
the variance of state wages. State inequalities explained by changes in the distribution of
the residuals increased by 0.020, which equals 91 percent of the increase in the variance
of state wages. Similar results are obtained when one examines the SLE per worker. One
way to interpret these findings is that if skill levels had not converged across states during
1990 to 2000, divergence in state incomes would have been even larger.18
I also study the effects of changes in prices and quantities of skills by means of the b-
convergence framework. Table 5 displays the b-estimators of regressing the price effect,
(g00 − g90)Xs,90, the quantity effect, g00(Xs,00 − Xs,90), and the residual effect, (vs,00 − vs,90)
against initial 1990 state wage and SLE per worker. The b-estimate of the combined skills
price and quantity effect is positive for state wages (0.0189) as well as for SLE pw
(0.0277), which means that the combined effect of changes on prices and quantities of
skills generated divergence across Mexican states. The positive b-estimate for the skills
price effect (0.0975 for wages and 0.0987 for SLE pw) indicates that changes in skill prices
contributed to state divergence. The b-estimate of the quantity effect is negative (−0.0786
for wages and −0.0719 for SLE pw), indicating state convergence. The b-convergence
results are similar to the s-convergence results.
Absolute and Conditional Divergence: State-Level Regressions
Per capita wages across states diverged in Mexico during the 1990s even after con-
trolling for changes in the returns to skill, and for changes in the distribution of skills
across states. The b-convergence between Mexican states fails when assuming identical
preferences and technology across states. This does not mean that neoclassical models are
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All skills
wrong; it is just that it was incorrectly assumed that Mexican states are similar. In a situ-
ation in which different countries or regions differ in terms of their steady state per capita
income levels, Solow’s model (1956) predicts conditional b-convergence. If economies are
not similar, conditional convergence indicates that the economies farther from their own
steady states grow faster. This section applies the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) method-
ology to inquire into the reasons for the divergence between Mexican states. 
Define the average growth rate of product (or income) per capita of state s (Ys) over
the time interval between periods t = 0 and t = T as follows:
(9)
where the parameter B governs the speed of the adjustment to the steady state. xs is the
technology level of state s and is the steady state level of product (or income) per capita
of state s. Multiplying by T, and solving the logarithms, equation (9) can be expressed as
follows:
(10)
Assuming similar steady states ( = Y*) and technology (xs = x), substituting a = xT
+ (1 − e−BT)·log(Y*) and b = −(1 − e−BT), and adding a random disturbance (es), equation
(10) can be written as: 
(11)
which is nothing but equation (1).
Considering unequal states, with different steady states of product (or income) per
capita and different levels of technology, equation (10) must be analyzed with state spe-
cific values of xs and . The problem is that one cannot predict the steady state levels.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1991) solution is to include other state variables (Xs) to approx-
imate the steady state values. 
Defining fXs = xsT + (1 − e−BT)·log( ) and b = −(1 − e−BT), and adding an error term
(es), equation (10) is modified as follows:
(12)
After controlling for differences in steady states and technology, the value of b, the
convergence coefficient, must be negative, indicating conditional convergence.
State-level regressions. The initial stock of human capital may influence the rate of
introduction of new technologies and ideas. I proxy a state’s initial level of human capital
by two variables, the mean level of education of the adult population in 1990 (EDU90),
and the number of elementary schools for every thousand inhabitants in 1990 (ELEM90).
Similar considerations lead to the inclusion of a measure of the initial level of public infra-
structure. The availability of transportation and a developed communications system in a
state is expected to facilitate growth and to attract foreign investment. Two measures of
log log log, , ,Y Y X Ys T s s s s( ) − ( ) = + + ( ) +0 0a f b e
Ys*
Ys*
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state infrastructure availability are included: the number of telephone lines per capita in
1990 (TELS90) and the number of airports for every thousand inhabitants in 1990
(AIRP90).
The distance from the U.S. border (DISTB) is included to reflect the innate advantage
of being closer to Mexico’s major trading partner. A second variable related to Mexico’s
growing economic interdependence with the U.S. which may affect the growth of differ-
ent states is FDI per capita in 1994 (FDI94).19 The initial share of agricultural employ-
ment in a state (AGREMP90) allows for the possibility that states intensive in the
production of agricultural commodities will experience slower growth in wages, especially
as the NAFTA liberalized trade in agricultural commodities while economic restructuring
decreased agriculture subsidies.
I estimated equation (12) for state wages and GSP using the independent variables dis-
cussed previously. Table 6 lists the results. Column (1) displays the estimated b-coefficient
for the initial level of wages (lnWAGE90) without adding any other independent variable.
This is the b-estimate presented in the last panel of Table 1. Its positive (0.1628) and sig-
nificant value implies absolute b-divergence in state wages.
Column (2) reports the results when four variables are added to the regression: 
EDU90, ELEM90, TELS90, and AIRP90. The sign of the estimated coefficient for
lnWAGE90 is small and is not significantly different from zero. EDU90 is positive and
significant, implying that the initially more educated states grew faster. The three infra-
structure variables (ELEM90, TELS90, and AIRP90) are positive but not statistically 
significant.
Column (3) shows the results for three independent variables closely related to trade
liberalization: FDI94, DISTB, and AGREM90. For this specification, the sign of the initial
value of lnWAGE90 is negative and significant, implying conditional convergence in state
wages. The three independent variables are significant and have the correct sign. States
that are closer to the U.S. border, receive larger amounts of FDI, and have smaller shares
of agricultural employment grew faster.
Column (4) combines all of the explanatory variables included in regressions 2 and 3.
This regression also implies conditional convergence of wages as the coefficient of
lnWAGE90 is negative and significant. Also, the coefficients for DISTB and AGREMP90
remain qualitatively the same and quantitatively quite similar. However, the coefficients
FDI94 and EDU90 become negative. The three infrastructure variables have the expected
positive signs but are statistically insignificant. These results indicate that FDI and the
infrastructure variables are highly correlated and that it is impossible to disentangle the
separate effects of these factors.
Columns (5), (6), and (7) replicate the models of columns (2), (3), and (4) using GSP
from 1993 to 2000. Results using GSP data are qualitatively similar to the results using
state wages but quantitatively weaker. The lack of data in state profits does not allow one
to observe the precise contribution of work and nonwork income on divergence in Mexico.
However, state-level regressions on GSP and wages suggest that profits may contribute 
to divergence in the same way as wages and variables such as distance to the border, 
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agriculture employment, and the initial level of education are the source of total income
divergence between Mexican states. 
A border story. The state-level results are now used to explain how state-level factors
such as international trade, agricultural employment, and FDI affected divergence during
the last decade in Mexico. Trade liberalization and domestic reforms decreased domestic
agricultural prices and investment. The reductions of import tariffs and quotas on agri-
cultural goods, and the virtual dismantle of subsidies and public credits negatively
impacted agricultural revenues. The share of employment in agriculture fell from 15
percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2000. Real wages in this sector decreased by 3.4 percent
a year while real wages at the national level decreased only by 1.6 percent a year. Hence,
it is expected that states specialized in agricultural production declined absolutely and rel-
atively between 1990 and 2000. 
The elimination of trade restrictions and foreign investment controls in Mexico and the
economic boom in the U.S. greatly increased trade between the two countries and resulted
in a substantial raise in FDI in Mexico. From 1994 to 2000, FDI increased by 7.5 percent
a year while international trade grew by 16.3 percent a year.20 The six northern border
states received a disproportionate share of the increased level of FDI, much of it in the
maquiladora sector.21 All workers in the richer northern states, close to the U.S. market,
did relatively well as a result of the export boom, the increase in FDI inflows, and the
general prosperity in the U.S. during the 1990s. The share of manufacturing employment
in the border region increased by 4.2 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, while in
the Federal District and its metropolitan area, this share decreased by 7.3 percentage points. 
There is some theoretical and empirical support for the new economic geography of
Mexico. Krugman and Elizondo (1996) argue that during the import substitution period,
1945–1985, manufacturers who produced for a relatively small domestic market in Mexico
found it advantageous to locate close to the main source of final demand, Central Mexico.
Once free trade is introduced and firms begin buying foreign inputs and selling to the U.S.,
transportation cost considerations will lead manufactures to move northward away from
Mexico City’s manufacturing belt.
It is also postulated that since FDI is complementary with skilled labor, the skill
premium will increase in northern states relative to other states. Hanson (1997, 1998) and
Hanson and Harrison (1999) documented for the 1980s the relatively large increase in the
wage of white-collar workers in the border states and used wage surveys of manufactur-
ers to link these wage increases to FDI. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) provide empirical
evidence that FDI may explain about 50 percent of the increase in the share of skilled
wages in the northern states during the 1980s. Airola and Juhn (2003) use the Mexican
Household Income and Expenditure Survey, for the period 1984–2000, to confirm that the
returns to skill increased sharply from 1984–1994. They find that the trend in inequality
slowed since 1994, a period during which FDI and trade increased. Thus, they are skepti-
cal that the rise in inequality in the 1990s was caused largely by FDI and outsourcing. 
As noted previously, from 1990 to 2000, wages for skilled workers increased relative
to wages for unskilled workers; but this increase was not larger at the border region, which
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has experienced a relatively larger inflow of FDI. At the national level, the wage bill share
of workers with twelve years of schooling or more increased by 12 percentage points (from
36.9 percent in 1990 to 48.9 percent in 2000). At the border region, this wage bill share
increased by only 8.7 percentage points (from 39.4 percent in 1990 to 48.1 percent in
2000).22 In addition, there is no evidence that the border region attracted more highly edu-
cated workers relative to other regions. Even though one observes a relatively large inflow
of migrants to the border region,23 these migrants were less educated (8.5 years) than
border workers (9.2 years) and even less educated than the average worker in Mexico (8.7
years) in 2000. While there is no question that wages of all workers are increasing at the
border relative to other states, there is no evidence that the relative demand of skilled
workers increased rapidly in this region.24
Conclusions
Trade and domestic policies implemented in Mexico during the last two decades of 
the twentieth century increased wages of skilled workers relative to wages of unskilled
workers. At the same time, richer states were relatively abundant in skilled workers. 
The economy-wide increase in the skill premium and the uneven distribution of skill
endowments across states contributed to the divergence in state incomes. However, skill
endowments continued to converge across states. Higher rates of educational acquisi-
tion in the poorer states counterbalanced the rise in skill prices. While changes in the 
prices of skills explained almost one-half of the increase in state income inequality,
changes in quantities of skills accounted for a one-third reduction in such income vari-
ability across Mexican states. This implies that unobserved changes in skill prices and
quantities and other unobservable factors accounted for most of the Mexican economic
divergence. 
In addition to the rising skill premium and the uneven distribution of educational levels,
other demand-related factors appear to have favored the richer states. The reduction of
tariffs that protected the agricultural sector and the virtual dismantle of subsidies and
public credits led to rapid declines in agricultural prices and employment. Consequently,
poorer states specialized in agricultural production declined during the last decade. The
elimination of trade restrictions and foreign investment controls and the economic boom
in the U.S. greatly increased exports, and FDI inflows favored rich states located close to
the U.S. border. All skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing-intensive states in
the North, with location advantages to the U.S. market, experienced relatively larger
increases in wages during the 1990s. Using state-level regressions, I find that states with
larger initial flows of FDI and lower shares of agricultural employment, and which are
located closer to the U.S. performed better. Public infrastructure and state FDI flows are
highly correlated and it is impossible to separate the effects of these variables. While border
states may have benefited from liberalization by attracting more foreign capital and by the
shift of Mexican manufacturing from central Mexico to the North, I find no evidence for
the claim that skill demand increased rapidly in this region or that this region attracted
more human capital relative to other regions. 
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NOTES
1. After forty or more years of import substitution policies and an external sector limited to crude
oil exports, the collapse of international oil prices and the peso crisis of 1982 forced Mexico to
open its market to international competition. The first attempt by Mexico to open the economy
occurred in the mid-1980s with its inclusion in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
a unilateral reduction in tariffs and quotas. The necessity of finding a new way to grow led the
country to participate, one decade later, in the largest free-trade area of the world, the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement. At the same time, domestic reforms such as privatizing state-owned
enterprises; assigning property rights to former communal lands; establishing autonomy of the
central bank; opening capital markets, allowing foreign direct investment and repatriation of
profits; reducing the value added tax; and containing union power modified the production struc-
ture of the economy. 
2. The adoption of trade liberalization and other market-oriented reforms impacted the wage struc-
ture in Mexico by increasing inequality and education premiums. Feenstra and Hanson (1997)
claim that wage differentials had increased over time, but this process began well before trade
liberalization. Harrison and Hanson (1999) argue that wage inequality in Mexico declined in the
decades prior to the trade reform but rose after it. Feliciano (2001) claims that wage dispersion
increased right after trade liberalization. And Airola and Juhn (2003) explain that wage inequal-
ity increased sharply during 1984–1994 but has remained unchanged since that time.
3. It is interesting to note that during the 1990s, average real wages decreased in all states but
decreased less in the richer states. A thorough examination of why real wages decreased is beyond
the scope of this article. One conventional explanation is the inflation that followed the peso
devaluation of December 1994 (Hanson 2005). Other possible explanations are the rapid growth
of the labor force during this period, the decline of union power, and the agricultural reforms that
decreased real agricultural prices.
4. Unfortunately, there is no official gross state product (GSP) data before 1970. I use the original
estimates provided by Appendini (1978) and used by Esquivel (1999). For 1970 to 2000, I
employed the official series from the Mexican Institute of Statistics (INEGI), which provides state
level output data every five years from 1970 to 1985 and annual data from 1993 to 2000.
5. The b-convergence is a necessary but insufficient condition to establish absolute change in dis-
persion (or absolute convergence/divergence) while s-convergence is a sufficient condition (Quah
1993). The b-convergence is a sufficient condition to establish relative change in dispersion (or
relative convergence/divergence) between regions. Absolute change in dispersion measures only
the change in the variance of the observations while relative change in dispersion considers the
change in the mean of the observations.
6. Campeche and Tabasco are the main producers of crude oil in Mexico and their GSP values are
overestimated. Oil in Mexico is owned by the federal government and profits from the extraction
of crude oil in such states go directly to the federal government.
7. The Mexican Economic Censuses (EC) of 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003 provide state-level data
on value added and payments to employees. The GSP in Mexico is calculated by the Value Added
(VA) method. Hence, GSP and VA from the economic censuses must follow similar patterns.
However, the EC does not survey over half of the national production. It does not include 
the primary sector (agriculture, livestock, and forestry), government, production of non-
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fixed-location businesses (street shops, taxi drivers, housekeepers, etc.), self-consumption, and
households’ production (in the year 2000, the share of households’ production was 35 percent of
national gross domestic product [GDP]). In addition, state VA of the construction, transport, and
financial services sectors are assigned to the state where the firms’ headquarters are located and
not where production takes place. As a result of the incomplete coverage of the EC and incon-
sistencies in the data, state VA reported in the EC converged between 1988 and 2003. This result
must imply a very strong state divergence in agriculture and households’VA. From 1993 to 2003,
the national sum of GSP per capita (in real terms) grew by 12 percent, while the national sum of
the economic census’ VA per capita (in real terms) grew by 25 percent. The VA from the EC rep-
resented 37 percent of national production in 1993 and 41 percent in 2003. This must imply a
significant growth of the “formal” production in Mexico.
8. Statistical inferences are significant at the state level because of large sample sizes, unlike the
Mexican Households Income-Expenditure Survey (ENIGH). In addition, the Population Census
data sets are nationally representative, unlike the National Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU),
which covers only large urban areas.
9. Notice that SLE per capita data goes from 1990 to 2000, while GSP per capita data goes from
1985 to 2000.
10. With regard to the compatibility of the Mexican System of National Accounts (MSNA) and
Mexican Population Census (MPC), Mexico’s GDP per capita in 1990 was 40,280 pesos (≈$4,260
U.S.) (http://www.ocde.org), while labor earnings per capita in 1990 (using the MPC data) were
12,504 pesos (≈$1,350). Labor earnings per capita represented 31.7 percent of GDP per capita
in that year. On the other hand, “Payments to Employees,” the name given to labor earnings on
the MSNA, represented 30 percent of the GDP in 1990 and 31 percent in 2000 (source:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx). Notice also that “Payment to Employees” in Mexico is considerably
smaller than in other countries, like the U.S. where it comprises almost two-thirds of the GDP
share.
11. The workers are all individuals who report positive labor earnings. When calculating SLE per
worker, I consider only those workers who worked at least half-time (thirty hours a week) and
earned at least half minimum wage (two pesos per hour). Working age population is defined as
all individuals between sixteen and sixty-four years old. 
12. Revenga (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Hanson (1997, 2003), Feliciano (2001), Cragg and
Epelbaum (1996), Szekely (1998), Airola and Juhn (2003).
13. Convergence in adult population education is also observed across Mexican states.
14. The b-convergence estimate of education is obtained by regressing the change on mean educa-
tion levels against the initial level of state wages: (EDU2000 − EDU1990) = a + b ln(wage1990).
15. As shown in Table 3, other population characteristics are also converging across Mexican states.
16. Note that the price effect here refers to the economy-wide change in skill prices, as the estimates,
g0 and g1, do not vary by state. If returns to skills rose differentially across states, these differences
would be absorbed in the residual term. To what extent did differential increases in the skill “price”
account for the divergence in state wages? Independent g-estimates (skill premiums) for education,
experience, and gender for every state of Mexico in 1990 and 2000 show that while returns to skills
did rise by different amounts across states, there is no systematic relationship between the rise in
skill premiums and initial wage or skill levels. These estimates suggest that the differential changes
in the skill premiums are not the culprit behind the divergence in state incomes.
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17. The same analysis can be done in a different order (i.e., allowing first state skill endowments to
vary, and attributing changes in skill prices to additional changes in state inequality in ln( ))
and would simply rearrange the assignment of interaction terms.
18. One can go forward and decompose the equation (4) price and quantity effects into each one of
the measures of skills: education, experience, and gender. For example, the predicted wage for
2000 allowing only the education premium to vary but keeping everything else at the 1990 
level is defined as 
Predicted wages for 2000 allowing other skill prices or state skill endowments to change but
keeping fixed everything else are calculated similarly. Table 4 also displays decomposition results
by measure of skill. The variance of ln( ), allowing only the education premium to change,
increased by 0.009, accounting for 40 percent of the increase in the variance of state wages. The
education quantity effect accounts for a 50-percent reduction in the variance of wages. The expe-
rience price and quantity effects account for 6 percent and 31 percent of the increase in the vari-
ance of state wages, respectively.
19. The initial year must be 1990; however, the first available year of FDI data at the state level was 1994.
20. Foreign direct investment increased from 10.7 billion dollars, or 2.5 percent of the Mexican GDP
in 1994, to 16.4 billion dollars, or 2.8 percent of the GDP in 2000. Similarly, international trade
increased from 42.7 billion dollars, or 13.6 percent of the GDP in 1991, to 166.5 billion dollars,
or 28.7 percent of the GDP in 2000.
21. In 1994, the Federal District received 39.6 percent of all FDI flows to the country, followed by
32.6 percent to the border region. In 2000, the border region hoarded 46.2 percent of all FDI
flows to Mexico and the Federal District only 24.2 percent.
22. At the national level, the postpreparatory wage ratio, defined as the average wage of workers with
twelve or more years of schooling divided by the average wage of workers with up to eleven years
of schooling, increased by 13 percent from 1990 to 2000. However, at the border region, this ratio
decreased by 1.5 percent.
23. Some 7.6 percent of all workers in the border region are interregional migrants while at the
national level, this number is 4.3 percent.
24. For a precise review of the effect of skilled biased technical change on the relative demands for
skilled and unskilled labor, relative wages, and wage-bill shares, see Acemoglu (2002), especially
pages 18–23.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D. 2002. Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 40(1): 7–72.
Airola, J., and C. Juhn. 2003. Wage inequality in post-reform. Mexico. Unpublished manuscript. 
University of Houston.
Appendini, K.A. 1978. Producto interno bruto por Entidades Federativas 1900, 1940, 1950 y 1960.
Unpublished paper. El Colegio de Mexico.
Aroca, P., M. Bosch, and W.F. Maloney. 2003. Is NAFTA polarizing Mexico? Or existe tambien el
sur? Spatial dimensions of Mexico’s post-liberalization growth. Unpublished paper. Universidad
Catolica de Chile.
Barro, R.J., and X. Sala-i-Martin. 1991. Convergence across states and regions. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 1: 107–158. 
ˆ
,
,Ys
P EDU
00
ln Y EDU EXP EXP GENs
P EDU EDU
s
EXP
s
EXP
s
GEN
s s,
,
, , , , , .00 00 90 90 90 90 90
2
90 90 90
2( ) = + + + +g g g g n
ˆ
,Ys
PQ
00
INCOME DIVERGENCE BETWEEN MEXICAN STATES 275
———. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy 100(2): 223–251.
Blau, F.D., and L.M. Kahn. 1997. Swimming upstream: Trends in the gender wage differential in the
1980s. Journal of Labor Economics 15(1): 1–42.
Chiquiar, D. 2002. Why Mexico’s regional income convergence broke down? Unpublished paper. 
University of California, San Diego.
Cragg, M.I., and M. Epelbaum. 1996. Why has wage dispersion grown in Mexico? Is it the incidence
of reforms or the growing demand for skills? Journal of Development Economics 51: 99–116.
Esquivel, G. 1999. Convergencia regional en Mexico. El Trimestre Economico 1940–1995 66(4):
725–761.
Esquivel, G., and M. Messmacher. 2002. Sources of regional (non) convergence in Mexico. 
Unpublished paper. El Colegio de Mexico.
Feenstro, R.C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 1997. Foreign direct investment and relative wages: Evidence
from Mexico’s maquiladoras. Journal of International Economics 42: 371–393.
———. 2002. Why NAFTA did not reach the south. Unpublished paper. El Colegio de Mexico.
Feliciano, Z.M. 2001. Workers and trade liberalization: The impact of trade reforms in Mexico on
wages and employment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55(1): 95–115.
Hanson, G.H. 1997. Increasing returns, trade and the regional structure of wages. The Economic
Journal 107: 113–133.
———. 1998. Regional adjustment to trade liberalization. Regional Science and Urban Economics
28: 419–444.
———. 2004. What has happened to wages in Mexico since NAFTA? Implications for Hemispheric
free trade. In Intergrating the Americas: FTAA and beyond, 505–537. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
———. 2005. Globalization, labor income and poverty in Mexico. NBER Working Paper 11027.
Hanson, G.H., and A. Harrison. 1999. Trade liberalization and wage inequality in Mexico. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 52(2): 271–288.
Harrison, A., and G.H. Hanson. 1999. Who gains from trade reform? Some remaining puzzles. Journal
of Development Economics 59: 125–154.
INEGI, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica. Censos de Poblacion y Vivienda
1990 y 2000 and Banco de Información Economica. http://www.inegi.gob.mx. Censos Económi-
cos 1988, 1993, 1998 y 2003. http://www.inegn.gob.mv. Anuano Estadistico de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos. Edición 1991.
Juan-Ramon, H., and L.A. Rivera-Batiz. 1996. Regional growth in Mexico: 1970–1993. IMF Working
Paper No. 25.
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and B. Pierce. 1993. Wage inequality and the rise in returns to skills. Journal
of Political Economy 101(3): 410–442.
Krugman, P., and R.L. Elizondo. 1996. Trade policy and the third world metropolis. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 49(1): 137–150.
Mallick, R., and E.G. Carayannis. 1994. Regional economic convergence in Mexico: An analysis by
industry. Growth and Change 25: 325–334.
Messmacher, L.M. 2000. Desigualdad regional en Mexico. El efecto del TLCAN y otras reformas
estructurales. Banco de Mexico. Documento De Investigación No. 2000–4.
Quah, D. 1993. Empirical cross-section dynamics in economic growth. European Economic Review
37(2): 426–434.
276 GROWTH AND CHANGE, JUNE 2006
Revenga, A. 1997. Employment and wage effects of trade liberalization: The case of Mexican manu-
facturing. Journal of Labor Economics 15(3): S20–S43.
Sanchez-Reaza, J., and A. Rodriguez-Pose. 2002. The impact of trade liberalization on regional dis-
parities in Mexico. Growth and Change 33: 72–90.
Solow, R.M. 1956. A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 70(1): 65–94.
Szekely, M. 1998. The economics of poverty, inequality and wealth accumulation in Mexico. St.
Antony’s Series. New York: St. Martins Press: London: MacMillan Press in association with 
St. Antony’s College. 
INCOME DIVERGENCE BETWEEN MEXICAN STATES 277
